03.PEASANT MOVEMENTS AND UPRISINGS AFTER 1857

It is worth taking a look at the effects of colonial exploitation of  the  Indian  peasants.  Colonial  economic  policies,  the  new  land revenue system, the colonial administrative and judicial systems, and  the  ruin  of  handicraft  leading  to  the  over-crowding  of  land, transformed  the  agrarian  structure  and  impoverished  the peasantry.  In  the  vast  zamindari  areas,  the  peasants  were  left  to the  tender  mercies  of  the  zamindars  who  rack-rented  them  and compelled  them  to  pay  the  illegal  dues  and  perform  begar.  In Ryotwari  areas, the Government  itself levied heavy land revenue. 

This  forced  the  peasants  to  borrow  money  from  the moneylenders. Gradually,  over large areas, the actual cultivators were reduced to the status of tenants-at-will, share-croppers and landless labourers, while their lands, crops and cattle passed into the hands of landlords, trader-moneylenders and rich peasants. 

When  the  peasants  could  take  it  no  longer,  they  resisted against the oppression and exploitation; and, they found whether their  target  was  the  indigenous  exploiter  or  the  colonial administration,  that  their  real  enemy,  after  the  barriers  weredown, was the colonial state. 

One  form  of  elemental  protest,  especially  when  individuals and  small  groups  found  that  collective  action  was  not  possible though  their  social  condition  was  becoming  intolerable,  was  to take  to  crime.  Many  dispossessed  peasants  took  to  robbery, dacoity and what has been called social banditry, preferring these to starvation and social degradation. 

The  most  militant  and  widespread  of  the  peasant movements was the Indigo Revolt of 1859-60. The indigo planters, nearly all Europeans, compelled the tenants to grow indigo which they processed  in factories set  up  in rural  (mofussil)  areas. From the  beginning,  indigo  was  grown  under  an  extremely  oppressive system  which  involved  great  loss  to  the  cultivators.  The  planters forced  the  peasants  to  take  a  meager  amount  as  advance  and enter  into  fraudulent  contracts.  The  price  paid  for  the  indigo plants  was  far  below  the  market  price.  The  comment  of  the Lieutenant  Governor  of  Bengal,  J.B.  Grant,  was  that  ‘the  root  of the  whole  question  is  the  struggle  to  make  the  raiyats  grow indigo  plant,  without  paying  them  the  price  of  it.’  The  peasant was forced to grow indigo on the best land he had whether or not he  wanted  to  devote  his  land  and  labour  to  more  paying  crops like  rice.  At  the  time  of  delivery,  he  was  cheated  even  of  the  due low  price.  He  also  had  to  pay  regular  bribes  to  the  planter’s officials. He was forced to accept an advance. Often he was not in a position to repay it,  but even  if he could  he was not allowed to do so. The advance was used by the planters to compel him to go on cultivating indigo. 

Since  the  enforcement  of  forced  and  fraudulent  contracts through  the  courts  was  a  difficult  and  prolonged  process,  the planters  resorted  to  a  reign  of  terror  to  coerce  the  peasants. Kidnapping,  illegal  confinement  in  factory  godowns,  flogging, attacks  on  women  and  children,  carrying  off  cattle,  looting, burning  and  demolition  of  houses  and  destruction  of  crops  and fruit  trees  were  some  of  the  methods  used  by  the  planters.  They hired  or  maintained  bands  of  lathyals  (armed  retainers)  for  the purpose. 

In practice, the planters were also above the law. With a few exceptions,  the  magistrates,  mostly  European,  favoured  the planters  with  whom  they  dined  and  hunted  regularly.  Those  few who  tried  to  be  fair  were  soon  transferred.  Twenty-nine  planters and  a  solitary  Indian  zamindar  were  appointed  as  Honorary Magistrates  in  1857,  which  gave  birth  to  the  popular  saying  ‘je rakhak se bhakak’ (Our protector is also our devourer). 

The discontent of indigo growers in Bengal boiled over in the autumn  of  1859  when  their  case  seemed  to  get  Government support. Misreading an official letter and exceeding his authority, Hem  Chandra  Kar,  Deputy  Magistrate  of  Kalaroa,  published  on 17  August  a  proclamation  to  policemen  that  ‘in  case  of  disputes relating  to  Indigo  Ryots,  they  (ryots)  shall  retain  possession  of their  own  lands,  and  shall  sow  on  them  what  crops  they  please, and  the  Police  will  be  careful  that  no  Indigo  Planter  nor  anyoneelse be able to interface in the matter.

The news of Kar’s proclamation  spread all over Bengal, and peasant  felt that the time for overthrowing the  hated system had come.  Initially,  the  peasants  made  an  attempt  to  get  redressal through  peaceful  means.  They  sent  numerous  petitions  to  the authorities  and  organized  peaceful  demonstrations.  Their  anger exploded in September 1859 when they asserted their right not to grow  indigo  under  duress  and  resisted  the  physical  pressure  of the  planters  and  their  lathiyals  backed  by  the  police  and  the courts. 

The beginning was made by the ryots of Govindpur village in Nadia  district  when,  under  the  leadership  of  Digambar  Biswas and  Bishnu  Biswas,  ex-employees  of  a  planter,  they  gave  up indigo  cultivation.  And  when,  on  13  September,  the  planter  sent a  band  of  100  lathyals  to  attack  their  village,  they  organized  a counter force armed with lathis and spears and fought back.

The  peasant disturbances and  indigo strikes  spread rapidly to  other  areas.  The  peasants  refused  to  take  advances  and  enter into  contracts,  pledged  not  to  sow  indigo,  and  defended themselves  from  the  planters’  attacks  with  whatever  weapons came  to  hand  —  spears,  slings,  lathis,  bows  and  arrows,  bricks, bhel-fruit, and earthen-pots (thrown by women). 

The  indigo  strikes  and  disturbances  flared  up  again  in  the spring  of  1860  and  encompassed  all  the  indigo  districts  of Bengal.  Factory  after  factory  was  attacked  by  hundreds  of peasants and village after village bravely defended itself. In many cases,  the  efforts  of  the  police  to  intervene  and  arrest  peasant leaders were met with an attack on policemen and police posts. 

The  planters  then  attacked  with  another  weapon,  their zamindari  powers.  They  threatened  the  rebellious  ryots  with eviction  or  enhancement  of  rent.  The  ryots  replied  by  going  on  a rent  strike.  They  refused  to  pay  the  enhanced  rents;  and  they physically  resisted  attempts  to  evict  them.  They  also  gradually learnt  to  use  the  legal  machinery  to  enforce  their  rights.  They joined together and  raised funds to fight court cases filed against them,  and  they  initiated  legal  action  on  their  own  against  the planters.  They  also  used  the  weapon  of  social  boycott  to  force  a planter’s servants to leave him.

Ultimately,  the  planters  could  not  withstand  the  united resistance  of  the  ryots,  and  they  gradually  began  to  close  their factories.  The  cultivation  of  indigo  was  virtually  wiped  out  fromthe districts of Bengal by the end of 1860. 

A major reason for the success  of the Indigo Revolt was the tremendous  initiative, cooperation, organization and discipline  of the  ryots.  Another  was  the  complete  unity  among  Hindu  and Muslim  peasants.  Leadership  for  the  movement  was  provided  by the  more  well-off  ryots  and  in  some  cases  by  petty  zamindars, moneylenders and ex-employees of the planters. 

A significant feature  of the Indigo  Revolt was the role  of the intelligentsia  of  Bengal  which  organized  a  powerful  campaign  in support  of  the  rebellious  peasantry.  It  carried  on  newspaper campaigns,  organized  mass  meetings,  prepared  memoranda  on peasants’  grievances  and  supported  them  in  their  legal  battles. 

Outstanding  in  this  respect  was  the  role  of  Harish  Chandra Mukherji,  editor  of  the  Hindoo  Patriot.  He  published  regular reports  from  his  correspondents  in  the  rural  areas  on  planters’ oppression,  officials’  partisanship  and  peasant  resistance.  He himself  wrote  with  passion,  anger  and  deep  knowledge  of  the problem  which,  he  raised  to  a  high  political  plane.  Revealing  an insight  into  the  historical  and  political  significance  of  the  Indigo Revolt,  he  wrote  in  May  1860:  Bengal  might  well  be  proud  of  its peasantry. . Wanting power, wealth, political knowledge and even leadership,  the  peasantry  of  Bengal  have  brought  about  a revolution inferior in magnitude and importance to none that has happened in the social history of any other country . . . With the Government  against  them,  the  law  against  them,  the  tribunals against  them,  the  Press  against  them,  they  have  achieved  a success  of  which  the  benefits  will  reach  all  orders  and  the  most distant generations of our countrymen.’

Din  Bandhu  Mitra’s  play,  Neel  Darpan,  was  to  gain  great fame for vividly portraying the oppression by the planters. The  intelligentsia’s  role  in  the  Indigo  Revolt  was  to  have  an abiding  impact  on  the  emerging  nationalist  intellectuals.  In  their very  political  childhood  they  had  given  support  to  a  popular peasant  movement  against  the  foreign  planters.  This  was  to establish  a  tradition  with  long  run  implications  for  the  national movement. 

Missionaries  were  another  group  which  extended  active support to the indigo ryots in their struggle. The  Government’s  response  to  the  Revolt  was  rather restrained and not as harsh as in  the case  of civil rebellions and tribal  uprisings.  It  had  just  undergone  the  harrowing  experience of the Santhal uprising and the Revolt of 1857. It was also able to see,  in  time,  the  changed  temper  of  the  peasantry  and  was influenced  by  the  support  extended  to  the  Revolt  by  the intelligentsia and the missionaries. It appointed a  commission to inquire  into  the  problem  of  indigo  cultivation.  Evidence  brought before  the  Indigo  Commission  and  its  final  report  exposed  the coercion  and  corruptio0  underlying  the  entire  system  of  indigo cultivation.  The  result  was  the  mitigation  of  the  worst  abuses  of the  system.  The  Government  issued  a  notification  in  November 1860 that  ryots  could  not be compelled to sow indigo and that it would  ensure  that  all  disputes  were  settled  by  legal  means.  But the planters were already closing down the factories they felt that they  could  not  make  their  enterprises  pay  without  the  use  of force and fraud.

Large  parts  of  East  Bengal  were  engulfed  by  agrarian  unrest during the 1870s and early 1880s. The unrest was caused by the efforts  of  the  zamindars  to  enhance  rent  beyond  legal  limits  and to prevent the tenants from acquiring occupancy rights under Act X  of  1859.  This  they  tried  to  achieve  through  illegal  coercive methods  such  as  forced  eviction  and  seizure  of  crops  and  cattle as  well  as  by  dragging  the  tenants  into  costly  litigation  in  the courts. 

The  peasants  were  no  longer  in  a  mood  to  tolerate  such oppression. In May 1873, an agrarian  league or combination  was formed  in  Yusufshahi  Parganah  in  Pabna  district  to  resist  the demands  of  the  zamindars.  The  league  organized  mass  meetings of  peasants.  Large  crowds  of  peasants  would  gather  and  march through villages frightening the zamindars and appealing to other peasants  to  join them. The league organized a rent-  strike  —  the ryots  were to refuse to pay the enhanced rents —  and challenged the  zamindars  in the courts. Funds were raised from the  ryots  to meet  the  costs.  The  struggle  gradually  spread  throughout  Pabna and  then  to  the  other  districts  of  East  Bengal.  Everywhere agrarian  leagues  were  organized,  rents  were  withheld  and zamindars  fought  in  the  courts.  The  main  form  of  struggle  was that  of  legal  resistance.  There  was  very  little  violence  —  it  only occurred when the zamindars  tried to compel the  ryots  to submit to  their  terms  by  force.  There  were  only  a  few  cases  of  looting  of the  houses  of  the  zamindars.  A  few  attacks  on  police  stations took  place  and  the  peasants  also  resisted  attempts  to  execute court  decrees.  But  such  cases  were  rather  rare.  Hardly  any zamindar  or  zamindar‘s  agent  was  killed  or  seriously  injured.  In the  course  of  the  movement,  the  ryots  developed  a  strong awareness  of  the  law  and  their  legal  rights  and  the  ability  to combine and form associations for peaceful agitation. 

Though  peasant  discontent  smouldered  till  1885,  many  of the  disputes  were  settled  partially  under  official  pressure  and persuasion  and  partially  out  of  the  zamindar‘s  fear  that  the united  peasantry  would  drag  them  into  prolonged  and  costly litigation.  Many  peasants  were  able  to  acquire  occupancy  rights and resist enhanced rents. 

The  Government  rose  to  the  defence  of  the  zamindars wherever  violence  took  place.  Peasants  were  then  arrested  on  a large  sale.  But  it  assumed  a  position  of  neutrality  as  far  as  legal battles  or  peaceful  agitations  were  concerned.  The  Government also promised to undertake legislation to protect the tenants from the  worst  aspects  of  zamindari  oppression,  a  promise  it  fulfilled however  imperfectly  in  1885  when  the  Bengal  Tenancy  Act  was passed. 

What  persuaded  the  zamindars  and  the  colonial  regime  to reconcile  themselves  to  the  movement  was  the  fact  that  its  aims were  limited  to  the  redressal  of  the  immediate  grievances  of  the peasants  and  the  enforcement  of  the  existing  legal  rights  and norms. It was  not aimed  at  the  zamindari  system. It also did not have  at  any  stage  an  anti-colonial  political  edge.  The  agrarian leagues kept within  the bounds  of  law,  used  the legal  machinery to  fight  the  zamindars,  and  raised  no  anti-British  demands.  The leaders  often  argued  that  they  were  against  zamindars  and  not the  British.  In  fact,  the  leaders  raised  the  slogan  that  the peasants  want  ‘to  be  the  ryots  of  Her  Majesty  the  Queen  and  of Her  only.’  For  this  reason,  official  action  was  based  on  the enforcement of the Indian Penal Code and it did not take the form of  armed  repression  as  in  the  case  of  the  Santhal  and  Munda uprisings. 

Once  again  the  Bengal  peasants  showed  complete  HinduMuslim  solidarity,  even  though  the  majority  of  the  ryots  were Muslim and the  majority  of  zamindars  Hindu. There  was also no effort  to  create  peasant  solidarity  on  the  grounds  of  religion  or caste. 

In  this  case,  too,  a  number  of  young  Indian  intellectuals supported  the  peasants’ cause. These  included Bankim Chandra Chatterjea  and  R.C.  Dutt.  Later,  in  the  early  I  880s,  during  the discussion of the Bengal Tenancy Bill, the Indian Association, led by  Surendranath Banerjee,  Anand  Mohan Bose  and Dwarkanath Ganguli,  campaigned  for  the  rights  of  tenants,  helped  form  ryot’ unions, and organized huge meetings of  upto 20,000 peasants in the  districts  in  support  of  the  Rent  Bill.  The  Indian  Association and  many  of  the  nationalist  newspapers  went  further  than  the Bill. They asked for  permanent  fixation of the tenant’s rent. They warned that since  the Bill would confer occupancy rights even on non-cultivators,  it  would  lead  to  the  growth  of  middlemen  —  the jotedars  —  who  would  be  as  oppressive  as  the  zamindars  so  far as  the  actual  cultivators  were  concerned.  They,  therefore, demanded  that  the  right  of  occupancy  should  go  with  actual cultivation  of  the  soil,  that  is,  in  most  cases  to  the  under  ryots and the tenants-at-will. 

A  major  agrarian  outbreak  occurred  in  the  Poona  and Ahmednagar  districts  of  Maharashtra  in  1875.  Here,  as  part  of the  Ryotwari  system,  land  revenue  was  settled  directly  with  the peasant  who  was  also  recognized  as  the  owner  of  his  land.  Like the  peasants  in  other  Ryotwari  areas,  the  Deccan  peasant  also found  it  difficult  to  pay  land  revenue  without  getting  into  the clutches  of  the  moneylender  and  increasingly  losing  his  land. 

This  led  to  growing  tension  between  the  peasants  and  the moneylenders  most  of  whom  were  outsiders  —  Marwaris  or Gujaratis. 

Three other developments  occurred at this time. During the early  I  860s,  the  American  Civil  War  had  led  to  a  rise  in  cotton exports  which had pushed  up prices. The end of the Civil  War in 1864 brought about an acute depression in  cotton exports  and a crash  in  prices.  The  ground  slipped  from  under  the  peasants’ feet.  Simultaneously,  in  1867,  ‘the  Government  raised  land revenue  by  nearly  50  per  cent.  The  situation  was  worsened  by  a succession of bad harvests.

To  pay  the  land  revenue  under  these  conditions,  the peasants had to  go to the moneylender who took the opportunity to  further  tighten  his  grip  on  the  peasant  and  his  land.  The peasant began  to turn against  the perceived  cause  of his misery, the moneylender. Only a spark was needed to kindle the fire.

 A  spontaneous  protest  movement  began  in  December  1874 in Kardab village  in  Sirur  taluq.  When the peasants of the village failed  to  convince  the  local  moneylender,  Kalooram,  that  he should  not  act  on  a  court  decree  and  pull  down  a  peasant’s house,  they  organized  a  complete  social  boycott  of  the  ‘outsider’ moneylenders to compel them to accept their demands a peaceful manner. They refused to buy from their shops. No peasant  would cultivate their fields. The bullotedars (village servants)  —  barbers, washermen,  carpenters,  ironsmiths,  shoemakers  and  others would  not  serve  them.  No  domestic  servant  would  work  in  their houses  and  when  the  socially  isolated  moneylenders  decided  to run away to the  taluq  headquarters, nobody would agree to drive their  carts.  The  peasants  also  imposed  social  sanctions  against those  peasants and bullotedars who would not join the boycott of moneylenders. This social boycott spread rapidly to the villages  of Poona, Ahmednagar, Sholapur and Satara districts. 

The social  boycott was  soon transformed into agrarian riots when  it  did  not  prove  very  effective.  On  12  May,  peasants gathered  in  Supa,  in  Bhimthari  taluq,  on  the  bazar  day  and began  a  systematic  attack  on  the  moneylenders’  houses  and shops.  They  seized  and  publicly  burnt  debt  bonds  and  deeds  —signed under pressure, in ignorance, or through fraud — decrees, and  other  documents  dealing  with  their  debts.  Within  days  the disturbances  spread  to  other  villages  of  the  Poona  and Ahmednagar districts. 

There  was  very  little  violence  in  this  settling  of  accounts. Once the moneylenders’ instruments of oppression —  debt bonds —  were  surrendered,  no  need  for  further  violence  was  felt.  In most  places,  the  ‘riots’  were  demonstrations  of  popular  feeling and  of  the  peasants’  newly  acquired  unity  and  strength.  Though moneylenders’ houses and shops were looted and burnt in Supa, this did not occur in other places. 

The  Government  acted  with  speed  and  soon  succeeded  in repressing  the  movement.  The  active  phase  of  the  movement lasted  about  three  weeks,  though  stray  incidents  occurred  for another  month  or  two.  As  in  the  case  of  the  Pabna  Revolt,  the Deccan disturbances had very limited objectives. There was once again  an  absence  of  anti-colonial  consciousness.  It  was, therefore,  possible  for  the  colonial  regime  to  extend  them  a certain  protection  against  the  moneylenders  through  the  Deccan Agriculturists’ Relief Act of 1879. 

Once  again,  the  modern  nationalist  intelligentsia  of Maharashtra  supported  the  peasants’  cause.  Already,  in  1873-74,  the  Poona  Sarvajanik  Sabha,  led  by  Justice  Ranade,  had organized a successful campaign among the peasants, as well as at  Poona  and  Bombay  against  the  land  revenue  settlement  of 1867. Under  its  impact, a  large  number of peasants had  refused to  pay  the  enhanced  revenue.  This  agitation  had  generated  a mentality of resistance among the peasants which contributed to the rise  of peasant protest in 1875. The Sabha as well as many of the nationalist newspapers also supported the D.A.R. Bill. 

Peasant  resistance  also  developed  in  other  parts  of  the country.  Mappila  outbreaks  were  endemic  in  Malabar.  Vasudev Balwant  Phadke,  an  educated  clerk,  raised  a  Ramosi  peasant force  of  about  50  in  Maharashtra  during  1879,  and  organized social banditry on a significant scale. The Kuka Revolt in Punjab was  led  by  Baba  Ram  Singh  and  had  elements  of  a  messianic movement.  It  was  crushed  when  49  of  the  rebels  were  blown  up by  a  cannon  in  1872.  High  land  revenue  assessment  led  to  a series  of  peasant  riots  in  the  plains  of  Assam  during  1893-94. Scores were killed in brutal firings and bayonet charges. 

There  was  a  certain  shift  in  the  nature  of  peasant movements after 1857. Princes, chiefs and landlords having been crushed  or  co-opted,  peasants  emerged  as  the  main  force  in agrarian  movements.  They  now  fought  directly  for  their  own demands,  centered  almost  wholly  on  economic  issues,  and against their immediate enemies, foreign planters and indigenous zamindaris  and  moneylenders.  Their  struggles  were  directed towards specific and limited objectives and redressal of particular grievances.  They  did  not  make  colonialism  their  target.  Nor  was their  objective  the  ending  of  the  system  of  their  subordination and  exploitation.  They  did  not  aim  at  turning  the  world  upside down.’ 

The  territorial  reach  of  these  movements  was  also  limited. They  were  confined  to  particular  localities  with  no  mutual communication  or  linkages.  They  also  lacked  continuity  of struggle or long-term organization. Once the specific objectives of a  movement  were  achieved,  its  organization,  as  also  peasant solidarity  built  around  it,  dissolved  and  disappeared.  Thus,  the Indigo  strike,  the  Pabna  agrarian  leagues  and  the  social-boycott movement  of  the  Deccan  ryots  left  behind  no  successors. 

Consequently,  at  no  stage  did  these  movements  threaten  British supremacy or even undermine it. Peasant  protest  after  1857  often  represented  an  instinctive and  spontaneous  response  of  the  peasantry  to  its  social condition.  It  was  the  result  of  excessive  and  unbearable oppression,  undue  and  unusual  deprivation  and  exploitation, and  a  threat  to  the  peasant’s  existing,  established  position.  The peasant  often  rebelled  only  when  he  felt  that  it  was  not  possible to carry on in the existing manner. 

He  was  also  moved  by  strong  notions  of  legitimacy,  of  what was justifiable and what was not. That is why he did not fight for land  ownership  or  against  landlordism  but  against  eviction  and undue enhancement  of rent.  He did not  object to paying  interest on  the  sums  he  had  borrowed;  he  hit  back  against  fraud  and chicanery  by  the  moneylender  and  when  the  latter  went  against tradition in depriving him of his land. He did not deny the state’s right  to  collect  a  tax  on  land  but  objected  when  the  level  of taxation  overstepped  all  traditional  bounds.  He  did  not  object  to the  foreign  planter  becoming  his  zamindar  but  resisted  the planter  when  he  took  away  his  freedom  to  decide  what  crops  to grow and refused to pay him a proper price for his crop. 

The  peasant  also  developed  a  strong  awareness  of  his  legal rights  and  asserted  them  in  and  outside  the  courts.  And  if  an effort  was  made  to  deprive  him  of  his  legal  rights  by  extra-legal means  or  by  manipulation  of  the  law  and  law  courts,  he countered  with  extra-legal  means  of  his  own.  Quite  often,  he believed  that  the  legally-constituted  authority  approved  his actions  or  at  least  supported  his  claims  and  cause.  In  all  the three  movements  discussed  here,  he  acted  in  the  name  of  this authority, the sarkar. 

In  these  movements,  the  Indian  peasants  showed  great courage  and  a  spirit  of  sacrifice,  remarkable  organizational abilities, and a solidarity that cut across religious and caste lines. 

They  were  also  able  to  wring  considerable  concessions  from  the colonial  state.  The  latter,  too,  not  being  directly  challenged,  was willing to compromise and mitigate the harshness of the agrarian system  though  within  the  broad  limits  of  the  colonial  economic and  political  structure.  In  this  respect,  the  colonial  regime’s treatment  of  the  post-1857  peasant  rebels  was  qualitatively different  from  its  treatment  of  the  participants  in  the  civil rebellions,  the  Revolt  of  1857  and  the  tribal  uprisings  which directly challenged colonial political power. 

A  major  weakness  of  the  19th  century  peasant  movements was  the  lack  of  an  adequate  understanding  of  colonialism  —  of colonial  economic  structure  and  the  colonial  state  —  and  of  the social framework of the movements themselves. Nor did the 19th century  peasants  possess  a  new  ideology  and  a  new  social, economic  and  political  programme  based  on  an  analysis  of  the newly  constituted  colonial  society.  Their  struggles,  however militant, occurred within the framework of the old societal order.

They lacked a positive conception of an alternative society a conception which  would unite  the  people in a common struggle on a wide regional and all-India plane and help develop long-term political movements. An all-India leadership  capable of evolving a strategy  of  struggle  that  would  unify  and  mobilize  peasants  and other sections of  society  for nation-wide political  activity could be formed  only on the  basis  of  such  a new conception, such a fresh vision  of  society.  In  the  absence  of  such  a  flew  ideology, programme,  leadership  and  strategy  of  struggle,  it  was  not  to difficult  for  the  colonial  state,  on  the  one  hand,  to  reach  a Conciliation  and  calm  down  the rebellious peasants by the grant of  some  concessions  arid  on  the  other  hand,  to  suppress  them with the full  use of  its  force. This  weakness was, of course,  not a blemish  on  the  character  of  the  peasantry  which  was  perhaps incapable  of  grasping  on  its  own  the  new  and  complex phenomenon  of  colonialism.  That  needed  the  efforts  of  a  modem intelligentsia which  was itself just coming into existence.

Most  of  these  weaknesses  were  overcome  in  the  20th century  when  peasant  discontent  was  merged  with  the  general anti-imperialist  discontent  and  their  political  activity  became  a part  of  the  wider  anti-imperialist  movement.  And,  of  course,  the peasants’  participation  in  the  larger  national  movement  not  only strengthened  the  fight  against  the  foreigner  it  also, simultaneously,  enabled  them  to  organize  powerful  struggles around  their  class  demands  and  to  create  modem  peasant organization.